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Abstract—Opportunistic relaying has the potential to achieve
full diversity gain, while random linear network coding (RLNC)
can reduce latency and energy consumption. In recent years,
there has been a growing interest in the integration of both
schemes into wireless networks in order to reap their benefits
while taking into account security concerns. This paper considers
a multi-relay network, where relay nodes employ RLNC to
encode confidential data and transmit coded packets to a desti-
nation in the presence of an eavesdropper. Four relay selection
protocols are studied covering a range of network capabilities,
such as the availability of the eavesdropper’s channel state
information or the possibility to pair the selected relay with
a node that intentionally generates interference. For each case,
expressions for the probability that a coded packet will not be
recovered by a receiver, which can be either the destination or
the eavesdropper, are derived. Based on those expressions, a
framework is developed that characterizes the probability of the
eavesdropper intercepting a sufficient number of coded packets
and partially or fully recovering the confidential data. Simulation
results confirm the validity and accuracy of the theoretical
framework and unveil the security-reliability trade-offs attained
by each RLNC-enabled relay selection protocol.
Index Terms—Relay selection, random linear network coding,
physical-layer security, outage probability, intercept probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
The dynamic nature of the wireless medium often introduces
problems to the operation of wireless networks, which are
related to node connectivity, communication reliability and
robustness [1]. Methods that can ameliorate the side effects
of wireless environments include opportunistic relaying and
node cooperation [2]. For example, opportunistic relaying was
proposed as an alternative to distributed space-time relaying;
it achieves full diversity gain [3] but can also improve energy
efficiency [4], [5]. Opportunistic routing based on cooperative
forwarding was presented in [6] to combat errors and link
failures in sensor networks. Multi-phase node cooperation for
indoor industrial monitoring was described in [7] as a means to
reduce energy consumption. Moreover, an experimental study
of selective cooperative relaying was provided in [8].
In energy-constraint wireless networks, such as sensor net-
works, the communicating nodes are typically battery powered
and have a limited energy budget. The improvement of the
network lifetime without a reduction in network reliability is
a major challenge. Random Linear Network Coding (RLNC)
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can decrease the number of distinct packet transmissions in a
network and minimize or eliminate packet retransmissions due
to poor channel conditions [9]. Consequently, RLNC has the
potential to both improve energy efficiency [10] and reduce
the overall latency in a network [11], which effectively lead
to an increase in the lifetime of the network. The key idea
behind RLNC is that nodes are allowed to linearly combine
stored data packets and generate coded packets, rather than
simply store and forward data packets. Advantages from using
opportunistic relaying with network coding in two-way relay
communications have been reported in [12]–[14].
Even though opportunistic relaying and RLNC have the
potential to improve energy efficiency and link reliability, the
broadcast nature of the wireless medium renders data transmis-
sion to an authorized destination vulnerable to eavesdropping.
The secure delivery of confidential data is important for many
applications, for example, sharing of sensitive information or
key distribution. Physical-layer security (PLS) is a promising
method that complements existing cryptographic techniques
and can be easily integrated into wireless networks that
combine opportunistic relaying with cooperative communica-
tion [15]–[17]. In [15], a relay selection metric that utilizes
knowledge of the relay-to-eavesdropper instantaneous channel
conditions was presented and the network performance was
evaluated in terms of the secrecy outage probability. Oppor-
tunistic relay selection protocols in the presence of multiple
eavesdroppers were studied in [16]. The effect of single-relay
and multi-relay selection on the performance of physical layer
security in wireless networks was investigated in [17] and
security-reliability tradeoffs were identified using comparisons
between the intercept probability and the outage probability of
direct transmission. Cooperative jamming has been proposed
as a means to further enhance PLS by selecting a node that
will generate intentional inference with the aim of degrading
the quality of an eavesdropper’s channel. For example, joint
relay-and-jammer selection techniques were proposed in [18]
to increase the secrecy capacity in wireless networks, whereas
suboptimal relay selection and suboptimal joint relay-and-
jammer selection protocols were compared in [19].
The main objective of PLS techniques is to increase the
secrecy rate between the source and the destination, while
ensuring that the transmitted information cannot be accessed
by an eavesdropper. Strict information-theoretic security is
achieved if and only if the mutual information between the
packets available to an eavesdropper and the source packets is
zero [20]. The performance of PLS schemes is often measured
by the secrecy capacity, which is the maximum rate for reliable
and perfectly secure communication, and the secrecy outage
2probability, which is the probability that secure communica-
tion will fail. However, these two metrics are used to optimize
the transmission rate, so that the legitimate destination will
fully recover the transmitted data with perfect secrecy. If
information-theoretic secrecy cannot be achieved, the secrecy
capacity and the secrecy outage probability do not provide any
insight into the likelihood of an eavesdropper recovering only
a fraction of the transmitted confidential information.
To the best of our knowledge, only few studies that exploit
the properties of RLNC in PLS are available. For example,
the intrinsic nature of RLNC against eavesdropping attacks
was analysed in [21] and the advantages of feedback-based
transmissions were identified. To enhance the secrecy of
cooperative transmissions in sensor networks, fountain-coding
aided cooperative relaying with jamming was proposed in [22].
In contrast to [22], where only one relay has been considered
for aiding the source in its transmission to the destination, we
consider the complete problem of selecting a relay or a relay-
jammer pair from the set of available nodes. Furthermore,
relays do not only perform decode-and-forward, as in [22],
but also linearly combine recovered data packets. In other
words, relays employ random linear fountain coding, which
can be seen as an implementation of RLNC for broadcast
communication. Other notable differences from [22] include
the derivation of the probability that a fraction of data will
leak to the eavesdropper, as opposed to the total amount of
transmitted data, and the investigation of the impact of both
the finite field size used by RLNC and the adopted forward
error correction and modulation scheme on the security and
reliability of the network.
The motivation for this paper is to investigate the potential
of relay-aided networks that combine RLNC with oppor-
tunistic relaying, with or without cooperative jamming, in
securely and reliably delivering confidential messages. To this
end, we consider four different relay selection protocols, we
analyze their outage behavior and we quantify the proportion
of the message that could leak to the eavesdropper with a
certain probability by the time the legitimate destination has
recovered the entire message with a target probability. The
main contributions of the paper can be summarized as follows:
1) We propose a cross-layer security scheme, which com-
bines the inherent secrecy features of RLNC at the ap-
plication layer with physical-layer security mechanisms,
based on relay selection with or without jamming.
2) We derive analytical expressions of the outage probability
at the destination and the eavesdropper. SNR thresholds
that characterize the modulation and coding scheme at
the physical layer have been used, so that the outage
probability can be linked to the packet error probability
in the case of Rayleigh frequency-flat fading channels.
3) We introduce a novel leakage metric, which is referred to
as the τ−intercept probability and is defined as the proba-
bility that a proportion of the transmitted information will
be compromised. An exact expression of the τ -intercept
probability is derived for systems that impose a deadline
on coded packet transmissions but provide the destination
with a feedback link, which can be used to terminate the
transmission process before the deadline expires.
4) We investigate the secrecy-reliability trade-offs of the
considered RLNC-enabled relay selection protocols.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the system model and introduces the relevant nota-
tion. A detailed description of the relay selection protocols is
provided in Section III and outage probability expressions for
both the destination and the eavesdropper are derived. The
equivalence between the outage probability and the packet
error probability is exploited in Section IV and an exact
expression of the τ -intercept probability for RLNC-enabled
opportunistic relaying is derived. Results are discussed in
Section V and conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a network that consists
of a source S, a destination D and a set of N trusted nodes
SN = {1, . . . , N}. The source could be an independent node
or an element of SN . The main objective of the nodes in
SN is to relay information from the source to the destination.
However, they can also cause interference to overhearing
attacks by an eavesdropper, denoted by E. Links between the
source and the destination as well as between the source and
the eavesdropper are not considered; the direct links could be
in deep shadowing or the destination and the eavesdropper
could be outside the coverage area of the source. This is an
assumption that is often made in the context of cooperative
communications [23], [24], as well as in cooperative relaying
for secure communications [19], [25], [26].
A centralized network topology has been used, whereby a
control unit located in the source S or a dedicated controller
node employs one of the following protocols in order to select
a single node or a pair of nodes:
1) Conventional selection: Similarly to [15], the relay that
provides the best instantaneous relay-to-destination chan-
nel quality is selected.
2) Optimal selection: Selection of the optimal relay consid-
ers the instantaneous channel quality of both links that
originate from each candidate node and terminate at the
destination and the eavesdropper, respectively [15].
3) Conventional selection with jammer: The conventional
selection protocol is first used to determine the node
that will act as a relay. The worst instantaneous relay-to-
destination link is then identified to determine the node
that will transmit noise concurrently with the chosen
relay in an effort to degrade the reception quality at the
eavesdropper while causing the least interference for the
destination.
4) Optimal selection with preset jammer: In this case, the
node that acts as a jammer is fixed, while the node that
acts as a relay is chosen from the remaining nodes in SN
using the optimal selection protocol.
The relay selected by each of the four protocols is denoted
by n∗, the jammer selected by the third protocol in the list is
represented by J∗, and the preset jammer in the last protocol
is denoted by J . We have opted for optimal selection with a
preset jammer in order to provide some insight into how the
reliability and security offered by optimal relaying is affected
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selection of the appropriate jammer that could further improve
the secrecy performance of the network at the expense of
reliability could be considered [18], [27] but this discussion is
beyond the scope of this paper.
In order to fully exploit spatial diversity, our analysis as-
sumes that the control unit has knowledge of the channel state
information (CSI) at the destination in all four protocols. The
control unit also has knowledge of the CSI at the eavesdropper
in the case of optimal selection with or without a jammer.
Note that this is a common assumption in the physical-layer
security literature [16], [28]. For example, the eavesdropper’s
CSI can be known if the eavesdropper is part of the network
of legitimate receivers when unclassified data are broadcast,
but is treated as an unauthorized receiver when confidential
data are transmitted. Even if an eavesdropper is never destined
to receive any type of transmitted data, its presence can still
be detected from power leaked via its antenna port while in
receiving mode [29].
The delivery of a confidential message by the source to the
destination using opportunistic relaying is divided into two
phases. In the first phase, the source broadcasts the message
and the candidate relay nodes operate in receiving mode. This
paper studies the impact that the RLNC-enabled relay selection
schemes have on the leakage and reliability of information
broadcast from the relay nodes. For this reason, we assume
that at the end of the first phase all of the relays have
successfully recovered the message. For example, the source
could employ RLNC to segment the message into multiple
packets and encode them. The source would then broadcast
randomly generated coded packets until all receiving nodes in
SN have reconstructed the message. Alternatively, the source
could transmit coded packets until one of the nodes in SN has
recovered the message; the nodes in SN could then use short-
range communication to exchange packets until all nodes have
knowledge of the message. In the second phase, each node in
SN divides the message into K data packets. Based on the
adopted relay selection protocol, the control unit instructs the
chosen relay n∗ to employ RLNC on the data packets and gen-
erate a coded packet. The coded packet is further processed by
the transmission scheme at the physical layer of the relay. The
transmission scheme, which involves forward error correction
and modulation techniques, can be accurately characterized
by a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) threshold, denoted by γth,
as described in [30]–[32]. This process is repeated up to NT
times and, thus, up to NT coded packets are transmitted; each
time, the appropriate relay is selected from SN , depending on
the instantaneous channel conditions. Both the destination D
and the eavesdropper E collect coded packets and use them to
construct local decoding matrices. If K linearly independent
coded packets are received, the rank of the decoding matrix
will be K. This implies that the K data packets can be
recovered and the entire message can be reconstructed. If the
destination recovers the message before the set deadline of
NT transmissions, it sends a notification to the control unit to
terminate the relay selection and packet transmission process.
The relay-to-destination links and the relay-to-eavesdropper
links have been modeled as independent but not identically
Table I
KEY PARAMETERS OF THE SYSTEM MODEL
Notation Description
K Number of data packets.
N Number of relay nodes.
SN Set of N trusted relay nodes.
Pi Transmitted power of node i.
N0 Variance of the additive white Gaussian noise
hi,j Fading coefficient of the channel between nodes i and j.
γi,j Instantaneous SNR of the link between nodes i and j.
λi,j The inverse of the average SNR of the link between
nodes i and j.
γth Required SNR threshold for signal recovery at the
receiving node u ∈ {D,E}.




nT Number of transmitted coded packets.
nR Number of received coded packets.
NT Maximum permitted number of coded packet transmissions.
distributed (i.n.i.d) quasi-static Rayleigh fading channels [18].
The channel gain between nodes i and j, denoted by |hi,j |,
remains constant for the duration of a coded packet but
changes independently from packet to packet. The variance of
the fading distribution is given by σ2i,j=E
{|hi,j |2} = d−αi,ji,j ,
where E
{|hi,j |2} represents the expected value of |hi,j |2, and
di,j and αi,j are the Euclidean distance and the path loss
exponent between the two nodes, respectively. Furthermore,
links are impaired by additive white Gaussian noise with zero
mean and variance N0. The instantaneous SNR of the link
between i and j is represented as γi,j = Pi|hi,j |2/N0, where
Pi is the transmitted power of node i. The probability density
function of γi,j is equal to [33]
fγi,j (γ) = Pr(γi,j = γ) = λi,je
−γλi,j (1)
where λi,j = 1/E {γi,j}. The cumulative density function of
γi,j can be obtained as follows
Fγi,j (γth) = Pr(γi,j ≤ γth) = 1− e−γthλi,j . (2)
For convenience, the key parameters of the system model have
been summarized in Table I.
Both the destination and the eavesdropper in the considered
system model apply the Gaussian elimination method on their
respective decoding matrices to compute their rank and recover
the source message. The objective of the destination is to
recover the entire message, i.e., all of the K data packets.
Traditionally, the communication process is deemed to be
secure if the eavesdropper fails to recover the message [21],
[34]. By contrast, this paper assumes that the probability of
the eavesdropper decoding the received coded packets and
recovering even a subset of the K data packets should be very
small. We shall refer to the probability of the eavesdropper
retrieving at least τ of the K data packets as τ -intercept
probability and we will evaluate it in Section IV. However,
we will first investigate the impact of the considered relay
4Figure 1. Block diagram of the system model.
selection protocols on the capability of the system to reliably
and securely relay confidential messages in Section III.
III. RELAY SELECTION AND OUTAGE ANALYSIS
This section describes the relay selection protocols in
greater detail, and characterizes their performance in terms
of the outage probability at the destination D and the outage
probability at the eavesdropper E. The outage probability is
the probability that the instantaneous signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) at a receiving node, either D or E,
will drop below a predefined threshold γth due to an event,
e.g., deep fading or interference. The outage probability at the
destination D and the eavesdropper E, denoted by ρD and ρE,
respectively, can be expressed as:
ρD = Pr(SINRn∗,D ≤ γth)
ρE = Pr(SINRn∗,E ≤ γth)
where n∗ represents the selected relay. As established in [30]
for Rayleigh fading channels and extended in [31] and [32]
for other channel models, the outage probability is a very
tight approximation of the packet error probability, if the
value of γth accurately reflects the employed modulation and
coding scheme. For example, γth = 5.89 dB for uncoded
BPSK and γth = −0.983 dB for BPSK combined with a
typical convolutional code [30] over Rayleigh fading channels.
Analytical expressions of ρD and ρE are derived in this section,
which first considers the protocols that only use opportunistic
relaying and then focuses on the protocols that combine
relaying with jamming.
A. Relay Selection Protocols without Jammer
1) Conventional selection: This protocol only considers the
channel quality of the relay-to-destination link. A relay n∗ is
selected from SN , such that
n∗ = arg max
n∈SN
γn,D.
Owing to the fact that no interference is introduced by a
jammer, the SINR at the destination D and the SINR at the
eavesdropper E are SINRn∗,D =γn∗,D and SINRn∗,E =γn∗,E,
respectively. The outage probability ρD can be obtained by
considering the joint probability of every node in SN being






(n∗ = n)∩ (γn,D ≤ γth)] . (3)
If we take into account that the channels are statistically
independent and that γn,D follows the distribution given in
(1), we can use order statistics [35] and obtain:














The joint probability in (3) can be obtained from (4) by setting









1− e−xλi,D)fγn,D(x) dx. (5)
Using the multinomial identity [36], the product of terms in (5)












where the inner sum in (6) is over all possible sets Sm of size
m that are subsets of SN but exclude the node n. Substituting


















Following the same line of thought, the outage probability at




Pr(n∗ = n)Pr(γn,E ≤ γth) (7)
because γn,D, which determines Pr(n∗ = n) is independent
of γn,E. Based on (2), we have
Pr(γn,E ≤ γth) = 1− e−γthλn,E









1− e−xλi,D)(1− e−γthλn,E) dx.















2) Optimal selection: This protocol is deemed ‘optimal’
because it exploits knowledge of the eavesdropper’s CSI and
achieves the maximum secrecy capacity [18]. For this reason,
this paper uses optimal selection as a benchmark protocol and
compares its performance to that of the other three protocols.
According to this protocol, the relay n∗ is selected such that







5The outage probability at the destination can be obtained from
the general expression (3) if the probability of the selected
relay being a particular node is expressed as:



















If we set Λi =
λi,D
λi,E








Using partial fraction expansion and simplifying the resultant
expression, (10) assumes the form:











Λi − Λk , for Λk 6= Λi.
Substituting (8) into (3) and taking into account that γn,D








I1(x, y)fγn,D(x)fγn,E(y) dx dy.
Invoking [37, eq. (3.352.1)] and the relationships in [38,







































where α1 = λn,E − λn,DΛj , α2 =
Λjλn,E
λn,D
− 1, β1 = λn,DΛj and
E1 is the exponential integral, as defined in [37].
The value of γn,E in optimal relay selection affects the
probability that a node will be selected to act as a relay. As
a result, and in contrast to (7), the outage probability at the







(n∗ = n)∩ (γn,E ≤ γth)] .
Taking into account (8) and recalling that the value of γn,E








I1(x, y)fγn,D(x)fγn,E(y) dx dy.
Derivation of an analytical expression for ρE requires a similar





















B. Relay Selection Protocols with Jammer
In an effort to increase the outage probability at the eaves-
dropper, a jammer can be employed by the two aforementioned
protocols. The selection mechanism of the jammer and its
impact on the outage probability at the destination and at the
eavesdropper are investigated in this subsection.
1) Conventional selection with jammer: This protocol is
based on a joint relay-jammer pair selection scheme. Similarly
to conventional selection, this protocol first selects a relay
n∗ from SN that provides the best instantaneous SNR at the
destination. Subsequently, one of the remaining nodes in SN
is selected to act as a jammer, such that it causes the least
interference to the destination. The pair selection scheme can
be described by the following expressions:
n∗ = arg max
n∈SN
γn,D
J∗ = arg min
j∈SN\n∗
γj,D.









repectively. Clearly, both SINRn∗,D and SINRn∗,E depend on
the selected nodes n∗ and J∗.
The outage probability at the destination should consider
the joint probability of a node n being the relay, a different
node m being the jammer, and the SINR at the destination not
exceeding the SNR threshold γth, for all possible values of n
















Taking into account that the instantaneous SNR of the jammer-
to-destination channel cannot be greater than the instantaneous
SNR of the relay-to-destination channel, and that the two
channels are independent, we can express the joint probability


















Pr(y ≤ γi,D ≤ x).



















using the multinomial identity. Substituting (13) into (12) and










I2(x, y)fγn,D(x)fγm,D(y) dx dy
where δ =∞ for γth ≥ 1, and δ = γth1−γth otherwise. Solving








































cn,m = (γthcn + cm), λD =
∑N
k=1 λk,D.
Due to the fact that the process of selecting the relay and the
jammer is independent of the eavesdropper’s CSI, the outage



















Using (13), we can express the joint probability of selecting






















while the probability that the SINR at the eavesdropper will




















2) Optimal selection with preset jammer: According to this
protocol, the control unit preselects a node J to act as a
jammer and then employs optimal selection on the remaining
nodes for each coded packet transmission. The identification
of a suitable jammer could depend on the average quality of
the link between the jammer and the destination. Due to space
limitations, the selection process of the preset jammer is not
further discussed in this paper because it does not affect the
outage analysis of this protocol. As in the case of optimal
selection, a node is selected to act as a relay such that







Owing to the interference noise generated by J , the SINR at








Using the law of total probability, as in the previous cases,












The probability that the selected relay n∗ will be a particular
node n can be obtained from (8) if the remaining N − 1 of
the N nodes in SN are considered, that is,





Iˆ1(x, y)fγn,D(x)fγn,E(y) dx dy (15)
where







Integrating (15) over all valid values of γn,D and γJ,D, as










Iˆ1(x, y)fγn,D(x)fγJ,D(z)fγn,E(y) dx dz dy
where υ = (z + 1)γth. Evaluating the integrals and utilizing










































)− 1αE1(η) + 1α+β e−η
where α3 = α1 − λj,DγthΛj , β2 = β1 +
λJ,D
γthΛj
, η1 = γthλn,D and
η2 = η1 + λJ,D.





























· fγn,E(y)fγJ,E(z) dx dy dz










Iˆ1(x, y)fγn,D(x)fγn,E(y)fγJ,E(z) dx dy dz.
Taking into account the formulas in [37], [38], we obtain

























Hn,j(α4, β3, η3) +
α1λJ,Ee
−λn,Eγth








where α4 = α1γth + λJ,E and β3 = η3 = β1γth.
The expressions for ρD and ρE that were obtained in this
section for the four considered protocols will be used in the
following section for the evaluation of the secrecy performance
of the system when the selected relay employs RLNC.
IV. SECRECY ANALYSIS
A. Preliminaries
As mentioned in Section I, when physical-layer security
over wireless fading channels is offered in the form of co-
operative jamming, the secrecy outage probability is often
the preferred metric for assessing the secrecy performance of
the system [18], [19], [26], [27]. Bloch et al. [39] provide
an excellent overview of important notions of physical-layer
security and present information-theoretic metrics. However,
information-theoretic metrics assume strong security, that is,
the eavesdropper decoding the encoded message is as likely as
guessing the message itself. In practice, the secrecy require-
ments can be less stringent and alternative metrics have been
proposed in [40].
Secure transmission on a multicast or broadcast network
can be guaranteed if RLNC is used to combine data packets
with random keys [41]. In conventional RLNC for multicast
or broadcast applications, as in this paper, data packets are
combined with other data packets in order to increase capacity
or improve reliability without the need for retransmissions.
As shown in [42], conventional RLNC can still offer strong
security, if the entries of the decoding matrix are transmitted
through a secure private channel to the intended destination,
and source coding ensures that the zero element is not included
in the data packets. Otherwise, RLNC offers weak security,
as defined in [43], implying that a receiver (either D or E)
may not be able to recover any meaningful information about
the message without collecting a sufficient number of linearly
independent coded packets. However, both [43] and [44] agree
that strong security can be achieved if RLNC operations are
over a large finite field.
The goal of this section is to investigate the inherent secrecy
of RLNC for any field size, when jamming may or may not
be available at the physical layer. In scenarios where secrecy
requirements are not stringent, the communication process is
deemed to be secure when the destination recovers the message
while the eavesdropper is unable to recover even parts of the
message without guessing. As explained in Section II, the
probability of the eavesdropper being successful in recovering
at least τ of the K data packets using Gaussian elimination
shall be referred to as the τ -intercept probability. A variant of
this metric has been used in the algebraic security criterion
[44]. According to [44, Definition 1], the level of security
provided by RLNC is a function of the data packets composing
the transmitted message, the number of linearly independent
coded packets collected by the eavesdropper and the number
of data packets that can be recovered by Gaussian elimination.
The latter quantity is actually τ and its value is assumed to
be readily available in [44], i.e., the level of security can be
calculated only after Gaussian elimination for a given set of
collected coded packets has been performed. By contrast, we
derive the probability that τ will take a specific value.
The remainder of this section presents a framework for the
calculation of the τ -intercept probability and the characteriza-
tion of the secrecy performance of the system.
B. Derivation of the τ -intercept probability
A receiver is required to collect K linearly independent
coded packets to recover the K data packets that compose the








where nR is the number of received coded packets and q
represents the size of the finite field over which arithmetic
operations are performed. The system of linear equations,
which is represented by the decoding matrix, may be partially
solved using the Gaussian elimination method and τ of the K
data packets could be revealed based on a subset of r ≤ K
linearly independent coded packets that have been received.
The probability of recovering exactly τ ≤ r data packets, given
that r linearly independent coded packets have been collected,
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(qν − qi), for ν ≤ u
0, for ν > u.
8Therefore, the probability of recovering at least τ data packets







where Pr(K,nR) is the probability that r out of the nR
received coded packets are linearly independent and is given












Using the aforementioned expressions, we can characterize
the secrecy performance of the system. Let XD and XE be
two random variables, representing the number of transmis-
sions required by the destination D and the eavesdropper E,
respectively, such that D can recover the entire message and E
can recover at least τ data packets. The cumulative distribution
function of XD and XE can be defined as:








ρnT−nRD (1− ρD)nR P (K,nR)








ρnT−nRE (1− ρE)nRP(τ, nR)
where ρD and ρE represent the probability that a transmitted
coded packet will not be received by the destination and the
eavesdropper, respectively. Both ρD and ρE can be evaluated
using the outage probability expressions that have been derived
in Section III for each relay selection protocol. Essentially,
FD(nT) is the probability that the destination will reconstruct
the entire confidential message, and FE(τ, nT) is the proba-
bility that the eavesdropper will recover at least τ of the K
data packets that compose the message, for nT or fewer coded
packet transmissions. The respective decoding probabilities for
exactly nT coded packet transmissions can be obtained from
the probability mass functions, as follows:
fD(nT) = Pr {XD = nT}
=
{
FD(nT)− FD(nT − 1), if K < nT ≤ NT
FD(K), if nT = K
fE(nT) = Pr {XE = nT}
=
{
FE(τ, nT)− FE(τ, nT − 1), if τ < nT ≤ NT
FE(τ, nT), if nT = τ
where NT represents the maximum permitted number of coded
packet transmissions. In the event of the destination recon-
structing the entire message before the deadline is reached, a
feedback link is used to notify the control unit that additional
coded packet transmissions are not required. Following the
same line of reasoning as in [21], the τ -intercept probability
assumes the form:





















































































Figure 2. Comparison between simulation and theoretical results, and
secrecy-reliability performance of the considered protocols for different values
of K, when q = 2 and τ/K = 0.6.
The first term in (17) is the probability that the eavesdropper
will be successful in recovering at least τ data packets from
the intercepted coded packets but the destination will fail to
reconstruct the message after NT coded packet transmissions.
The second term represents the probability that the destination
will recover the entire message after the nT-th coded packet
has been transmitted but the eavesdropper has already recov-
ered at least τ data packets by that time.
The impact of the relay selection protocol on the outage
probabilities ρD and ρE, and their effect on the intercept
probability Pint(τ,NT) and the decoding probability at the
destination FD(NT) will be explored in the following section.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section presents simulation results and compares them
with analytical results in order to validate the accuracy of the
derived expressions. The secrecy performance of the system,
which is reflected by the intercept probability at the eaves-
dropper, and the reliability performance of the system, which
is associated with the outage probability of the link between
the selected relay and the destination but also the decoding
probability at the destination, are also discussed.
A Monte Carlo simulation platform representing the system
model was developed in MATLAB. Instances where the eaves-
dropper successfully recovered at least τ data packets were
counted and averaged over 104 realizations to compute the
τ -intercept probability. The simulation environment considers
N = 10 relays. Let the pair (di,D, di,E) specify the distance
of node i from the destination D and the eavesdropper E, for
i = 1, . . . , 10. The distance pairs in the simulation environ-
ment have been configured as follows: (2, 2.3), (3, 2), (4, 6),
(3, 4), (4, 5), (1, 2), (1, 2.1), (1.3, 1.5), (1.2, 1.9) and (6, 6).
In the case of optimal selection with preset jammer, we have
configured the node with distance pair (6, 6) to always act as a
9jammer. This node is equidistant from the destination and the
eavesdropper, hence it causes the same levels of interference,
on average, to both receivers. Pre-selection of this jammer
yields a particular trade-off between secrecy performance and
reliability but other schemes that trade reliability for secrecy
are also available, e.g., [18], [27]. In all cases, the path loss
exponents have been set to αi,j = α = 3. Unless otherwise
stated, the transmission scheme is uncoded BPSK, which
is characterized by the SNR threshold γth = 5.89 dB. As
explained in Section III, the outage probability depends on the
relay selection protocol and the transmission scheme but not
on the RLNC parameters. The lowest number of transmitted
coded packets, for which the destination can decode the entire
message with 90% probability or greater, has been used in
the measurement of the intercept probability. Equivalently, the
theoretical value of Pint(τ,NT) has been calculated from (17)
for the smallest value of NT that yields FD(NT) ≥ 0.90. For
simplicity, we assume that all nodes, including the jammer,
transmit the same power, i.e. Pi = P . The term ‘SNR’ is
used to refer to the ratio P/N0, as defined in Section II. The
four relay selection protocols, namely conventional selection,
optimal selection, conventional selection with jammer and
optimal selection with preset jammer, have been abbreviated
to ‘CS’, ‘OS’, ‘CSWJ’ and ‘OSWJ’, respectively.
Fig. 2 demonstrates the agreement between simulation
and analytical results, which confirms the correctness of our
derivations. It also illustrates the effect of the transmitted SNR
on the outage probability at the destination and compares
the intercept probability of the four considered protocols. As
expected, the CS scheme outperforms the other protocols in
terms of reliable communication because it achieves the lowest
outage probability. By contract, the CS protocol exhibits the
worst performance in terms of secrecy. This is due to the
fact that the CS protocol only considers the quality of relay-
to-destination channels but does not take into account the
relay-to-eavesdropper channels. For this reason, the OS and
CSWJ protocols offer better secrecy performance than CS
at the expense of reduced reliability. It can be noticed that
the secrecy performance of both the CS and OS protocols
deteriorates markedly at high SNR values because the intercept
probability converges to one. On the other hand, the secrecy
performance of the CSWJ and OSWJ protocols reveals that a
jammer introduces a ‘ceiling’ to the intercept probability and,
thus, a level of secrecy can be offered even at high SNR values.
Fig. 2 also demonstrates that the secrecy-reliability tradeoff
can be further improved if the message to be transmitted is
segmented into a larger number of shorter data packets, that
is, the value of K in RLNC is increased.
Fig. 3 investigates the effect that the field size q in RLNC
has on the probability that the eavesdropper will reconstruct at
least τ = 8 data packets from the intercepted coded packets,
for different SNR values, when K = 15 and either CSWJ
or OSWJ is used. The figure shows that when the field size
increases from q = 2 to q = 4, the intercept probability
decreases notably. This is due to the fact that the larger the
finite field is, the higher the probability of the received coded
packets being linearly independent is. Consequently, if q = 4,
the destination is required to collect fewer coded packets in
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Figure 3. Effect of the field size q on the secrecy performance of both CSWJ








































Figure 4. Performance comparison in terms of the amount of recovered data
and the SNR value, for q = 2 and K = 15.
order to reconstruct the entire message than if q = 2. On
the other hand, if the finite field is large and the rank of the
decoding matrix is smaller than K, the probability of partially
reconstructing the transmitted message reduces significantly.
For this reason, the fewer the linearly independent coded
packets intercepted by the eavesdropper are, the smaller the
probability of the eavesdropper recovering even a fraction
of the message is. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 reveal the impact of
the number of data packets K and the field size q on both
reliability and security. Although the intercept probability
decreases if the message is segmented into a larger number of
data packets or if a larger field size is used, the values of K
and q cannot increase unboundedly in practice. An increase in
K or q also increases the overhead of RLNC and the decoding
complexity of Gaussian elimination. Upper bounds for K and
q due to practical limitations are discussed in [49].
Fig. 4 compares the τ -intercept probability offered by the
considered protocols for all possible values of τ and different
transmitted SNR values, when q = 2 and K = 15. At low
SNR values, the probability of recovering data packets from
intercepted coded packets is very small, regardless of the
adopted protocol. For example, even when the CS protocol
is employed, the probability of the eavesdropper recovering
10






















































CS (q = 2)
OS (q = 2)
CSWJ (q = 2)
OSWJ (q = 2)
CS (q = 64)
OS (q = 64)
CSWJ (q = 64)
OSWJ (q = 64)
Figure 5. Delay performance as a function of SNR for q = 2 and q = 64,
when K = 15 is considered.
at least one data packet (τ = 1) is 0.18 at SNR = 16 dB.
However, for high SNR values, the CS scheme clearly yields
the worst performance. For example, the performance curve
of the CS protocol shows that even though the probability
of recovering the entire data message (τ = 15) is low, the
eavesdropper can still recover a large portion of data with
high probability. The other three protocols provide better
performance even for τ = 1.
Fig. 5 compares the delay performance of each protocol,
in terms of the maximum permitted number of coded packet
transmissions required by the destination to recover the entire
data message. This delay metric also reflects the reliability of
the network. The impact of the field size q on the secrecy-
reliability tradeoff is depicted in this figure too. Both CS and
CSWJ exhibit fixed and similar delay performance in the high
SNR regime, even though CS offers higher link reliability than
CSWJ, as established in Fig. 2. For q = 64, both CS and CSWJ
achieve the minimum delay performance, i.e. NT = 15. The
worst-case delay is experienced when RLNC over fields of
size q = 2 is combined with either OS or OSWJ. The delay
of OS and OSWJ is reduced if the field size is increased to
q = 64 and approaches the delay of CS and CSWJ for an
increasing SNR value.
Fig. 6 focuses on the CS scheme and further investigates
the reliability versus secrecy trade-off between uncoded BPSK
and coded BPSK. The SNR threshold for coded BPSK, which
employs convolutional coding, is set to γth = −0.983 dB, as
mentioned in Section III. As expected, coded BPSK achieves
a lower outage probability than uncoded BPSK at the expense
of a notably higher intercept probability. This is due to the fact
that the information redundancy introduced by convolutional
coding assists not only the destination but also the eaves-
dropper in the error-free reception of coded packets and the
recovery of at least τ data packets. Our proposed framework
can thus be used to identify modulation and coding schemes
that offer a required balance between security and reliability.
For each point depicted in the previous figures, the maxi-
mum permitted number of transmitted coded packets NT has
been computed so that the probability of the destination de-
















































Figure 6. Secrecy-reliability trade-off as a function of the SNR for two
different transmission schemes, K = 15, q = 2 and τ = 8.
























































Figure 7. Performance comparison based on the decoding probability and
the zero-intercept probability at SNR=30 dB, for K = 15 and q = 2.
coding the entire message is at least 90%, i.e., FD(NT) ≥ 0.9.
In contrast, Fig. 7 investigates the impact of NT on both
the decoding probability at the destination FD(NT) and the
probability that the eavesdropper will be unable to recover
any data packets. The latter probability is referred to as the
zero-intercept probability and is given by 1−Pint(1, NT). As
expected, an increase in coded packet transmissions improves
the decoding probability at the destination and decreases the
zero-intercept probability. The benefit from using a feedback
link to notify the control unit to cease the transmission of
coded packets when the destination has recovered the entire
message, can also be observed in Fig. 7. For a high value of
NT, the destination is more likely to decode the message when
fewer than NT coded packets have been transmitted. As a
result, the transmission process will be terminated earlier than
anticipated and the eavesdropper will be unable to collect more
coded packets. For this reason, the zero-intercept probability
gradually converges to a fixed value for an increasing value of
NT. We note that the CS protocol yields the highest decoding
probability but provides no guarantees that the eavesdropper
will recover no data packets. The selection of a jammer that
causes the least interference to the transmitting relay gives
CSWJ a security advantage over CS without a compromise on
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the decoding probability. Exploitation of the eavesdropper’s
CSI can further increase the zero-intercept probability and
boost security, even when a jammer is not employed, as
demonstrated by the OS protocol. On the other hand, OSWJ
yields the highest zero-intercept probability at the expense of
a lower decoding probability than the other protocols. The
results reaffirm that the security advantage gained by opting
for a protocol other than CS clearly outweighs the loss in
reliability, when SNR = 30 dB.
VI. CONCLUSION
In order to address the vulnerability of wireless communi-
cation networks against eavesdropping attacks, we developed
a framework that combines random linear network coding
at the application layer and physical-layer security in the
form of relay selection with or without cooperative jamming.
Four relay selection protocols were considered and analytical
expressions of the outage probability at the intended destina-
tion and the eavesdropper were derived. In order to quantify
the amount of information leakage to the eavesdropper, a
novel metric called τ -intercept probability was proposed. This
metric, which utilizes the outage probabilities associated to
each relay selection protocol, provides a measure of security
that is jointly offered by the application and physical layers in
scenarios where secrecy requirements are not stringent. Our
analysis demonstrated that relay selection based on both the
eavesdropper’s CSI and the destination’s CSI achieves a good
balance between security and reliability, when a jammer is not
employed. If a jammer is used, reliability can be traded for
security. On the other hand, if the eavesdropper’s CSI is not
available, the selection of a relay and a jammer based solely
on the destination’s CSI favors reliability, while still providing
some secrecy guarantees. We also noted that the field size
over which random linear network coding is performed at the
application layer as well as the adopted modulation and coding
scheme at the physical layer can be modified to fine-tune the
trade-off between security and reliability.
Future directions on this topic could involve the introduction
of direct communication from the source to both the des-
tination and the eavesdropper, the consideration of multiple
eavesdroppers and the study of the effect of constellation
rotation, as proposed in [22], on the security and reliability
of the network.
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